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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAMIE J. TEMPEST, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
. JAMES K. RICHARDSON and 
'WILMA L. RICHARDSON, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No . 
8466 
The respondents, hereinafter called the defendants, 
concede that appellant's Statement of Facts is correct in 
all material and substantial respects. Appellant will here-
inafter be referred to as plaintiff. However, it is respect-
fully pointed out that references to the claimed acts of 
negligence alleged in plaintiff's complaint, which are 
mentioned in the Statement of Facts, are not established 
by any evidence. 
The plaintiff's complaint, in substance, alleges that 
plaintiff asked to be directed to the lavatory on defend-
ants' premises and that she was carelessly and negligently 
directed by Mrs. Richardson toward a certain door; that 
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the door to which plaintiff's attention was directed was 
constructed and maintained in a negligent manner so as 
to create a hidden trap unknown to plaintiff. 
The record actually shows that no directions were 
asked or given and that plaintiff's attention was not di-
rected to any door and in particular to the door which 
she opened. The record further shows that plaintiff and 
Mrs. Richardson were in the kitchen of defendants' home 
following a dinner in another part of the house. The 
two women were alone when plaintiff left the kitchen 
area by entering an adjacent hallway and at the same 
time stating, ul am going to the lavatory." Mrs. Rich-
ardson, one of the defendants, simply replied, nThe light 
is on." ( TR. 13 -14) 
Plaintiff's decision to open the cellar door, which was 
closed, and to step forward into a dark and unlighted 
void was not influenced or directed by any act or word 
of either defendant. The record is clear that Mr. Rich-
ardson was not present at the time and was completely 
unaware of what was happening. The record is likewise 
perfectly clear that Mrs. Richardson did not follow 
plaintiff into the hallway and therefore could not have 
been aware of plaintiff's movements or that she was about 
to open the door leading to the cellar steps. (D. 13-17 It 
is certain that plaintiff asked for no directions even after 
she had mistakenly entered a lighted bedroom or den 
thinking it was the lavatory. The statement made by 
Mrs. Richardson was clear and explicit that the lava-
tory light was on so that plaintiff was advised, if not 
warned, that she should look /or a lighted room and not 
one in complete and total darkness. 
I ri .~ 
I~ 
I 
I .• 
I ~. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A 
MATERIAL FACT. 
w~ 
lt~ (a) THE PLAINTIFF WAS A SOCIAL GUEST 
w~ ENTITLED ONLY TO THE PROTECTION OWED 
!~ TO A GRATUITOUS LICENSEE AND AS TO 
~ PLAINTIFF THE DEFENDANTS COMMITTED NO 
Th AFFIRMATIVE ACT OF NEGLIGENCE AND VIO-
ttk LATED NO DUTY OWING TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
:m (b) THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CON-
~ TRIBUTOR Y NEGLIGENCE 
lWI 
lrtel 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A 
MATERIAL FACT. 
(a) PLAINTIFF WAS A SOCIAL GUEST EN-
TITLED ONLY TO THE PROTECTION OWED TO 
A GRATUITOUS LICENSEE, AND AS TO PLAIN-
TIFF THE DEFENDANTS COMMITTED NO AF-
FIRMATIVE ACT OF NEGLIGENCE AND VIO-
LATED NO DUTY OWING TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff concedes in her brief that, as to the defend-
ants' she occupied the status of a social guest. As such, 
plaintiff was a gratuitous, or, as is sometimes called, a 
bare licensee. 
McHenry v. Howells, (Ore.) 272 P. 2d 21 0 
Taneian v. Meghrigian, N.J.) 99 Atl. 2d 207 
Keretian v. Asadourian, (Ill.) 110 N.E. 2d 679 
Lubenow v. Cook, (Conn.) 79 Atl. 2d 826 
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McNamara v. Hall, (Wash.) 233 P. 2d 852 
O'Brien v. Shea, (Mass.) 96 N.E. 2d 163 
Biggs v. Bear, (Ill.) 51 N.E. 2d 799 
Laube v. Stevenson, (Conn.) 78 Atl. 2d 693 
It is most important to bear the status of the plaintiff 
constantly in mind because the authorities, so far as we 
have been able to determine, are unanimous in holding 
that the only duty which a host owes to a social guest 
is to refrain from affirmative acts likely to cause injury 
and to warn the guest of hidden or concealed dangers 
which the guest by the exercise of ordinary care cannot 
or may not see and avoid. 
Taneian v. Meghrigian, supra 
N iebes v. Order of Eagles, (Ohio) 114 N .E. 2d 2 60 
Keretian v. Asadourian, supra 
Scheibel v. Lipton, (Ohio) 102 N.E. 2d 453 
Bogateroff v. Coplan, New York Supp., 108 
N.Y.S. 2d 205 
Lubenow v. Cook, supra 
O'Brien v. Shea, supra 
McHenry v. Howells, supra 
Furthermore, a host is not liable to a guest for ordi-
nary acts of negligence. 
Niebes v. Order of Eagles, supra 
Biggs v. Bear, supra 
The rule is likewise well established that a social 
guest takes the premises of his host as he finds them and 
the host is only obligated to provide the guest with the 
same protection which he takes for himself and members 
of his own family, and no more. 
I..._: 
I 
~ .. 
-.. 
I
;-· 
.. 
I:.:; 
.:. 
I
:·.· . ' 
'i'' i .. 
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Taneian v. Meghrigian, supra 
Vogel v. Eckert, (N.J.) 91 Atl. 2d 633 
McHenry v. Howells, supra 
Biggs v. Bear, supra 
The law is also well established that a host is not the 
insurer of the safety of a social guest and is under no 
duty to reconstruct his premises for the safety of a guest. 
Scheibel v. Lipton, supra 
McHenry v. Howells, supra 
In two very respectable jurisdictions in this country 
it has been held that there must be evidence of willful 
and wanton injury before a host can be held liable to a 
social guest for injuries sustained on the premises of the 
host. 
Keretian v. Asadourian, supra 
Gregory v. Loder, (N.J.) 185 Atl. 360 
If the foregoing are the rules by which the conduct 
of the defendants is to be measured, and we submit that 
they are, then every issue of fact which must be decided 
is disclosed by the record now before this court and does 
not require the taking of any evidence to amplify that 
which is already made plain. 
Plaintiff cites many cases in her brief in support of 
the proposition that summary judgment is improper if, 
upon the record, any material issue remains to be de-
cided which if decided for the plaintiff would sustain 
a judgment in her favor. The defendants have no quarrel 
with the rule contended for but deny that the rule and 
the cases cited in support of it have any application to 
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this case. We will point out hereafter why no material 
issue of fact exists which could or might change the 
result of the trial court's ruling. 
We cannot pass the contentions of the plaintiff with-
out referring to the reasons which make summary judg-
ment a desirable procedural remedy in applicable cases. 
The rule is designed to save the time and expense of 
parties, their counsel, witnesses, jurors and the courts 
when the record in a case discloses that it may be de-
cided equitably and fairly to all concerned without the 
necessity for a trial. That this saving of time and ex-
pense is desirable needs no supporting argument. This 
court has recognized the desirability of the rule_ by 
adopting it as part of the rules of civil procedure appli-
cable to all civil cases in this jurisdiction. Mr. Justice 
Crockett in his concurring opinion in the very recently 
decided case of Holland v. Colzunbia Iron Mining Co., 
(Utah) 293 P. 2d 700, says this: 
nit is true, indeed, that a summary judgment 
is a drastic remedy which the courts are, and 
should be reluctant to use. Yet it does have a 
salutary purpose in the administration of justice 
in not requiring the time, trouble and expense of 
trial, when the best showing the plaintiff can pos-
sibly claim would not entitle him to a judgment. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff does not mean that the court 
should pick out all of the aspects thereof favorable 
to supporting plaintiff's claim and ignore those 
that indicate to the contrary. It means that the 
court surveys the whole picture, takes into con-
sideration facts and inferences therefrom tending 
to favor the plaintiff's position, and also considers 
I· 
! :~ 
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other facts appearing which must be accepted 
as a matter of law, and weighs the whole matter 
against the background of legal precepts bearing 
on the problem. If when so viewed, reasonable 
minds could make findings that would make out 
a cause of action in accordance with the plain-
tiff's claims, summary judgment should not be 
granted; on the other hand, if it appears to the 
court that reasonable minds could not make find-
ings which would establish a cause of action for 
the plaintiff, then the summary judgment is 
proper." 
Based upon the proposition that when the whole pic-
ture presented by the record in this case is considered, 
reasonable minds could not make findings which would 
sustain a judgment for the plaintiff, the order of the trial 
court granting summary judgment should be affirmed. 
There is no contention that the defendants did any 
affirmative act which caused plaintiff's injury. Since the 
authorities, which we have cited above, hold that a guest 
must accept the premises of his host as he finds them and 
the host is under no duty to rebuild or reconstruct his 
premises to make them safer for his guest than they are 
for himself and the members of his own family, no recov-
ery may be predicated in this case upon the claim that the 
premises were negligently constructed or maintained. 
The brief of the plaintiff discloses two propositions 
which are relied upon to support the claim that the sum-
mary judgment entered by the trial court was erroneous. 
They are: (a) That no warning was given by Mrs. Rich-
ardson that the particular door which plaintiff opened 
gave access to the cellar, and (b) that the manner in 
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which the stairway was constructed was defective and, 
therefore, as to the plaintiff, was negligent maintenance. 
We have cited the cases above which fully sustain the 
defendants' position that it does not lie in the mouth of 
the plaintiff to criticize the construction of the house to 
which she had been invited for purely social purposes, 
therefore, we will make no further reference to that par-
ticular point in the plaintiff's brief. 
The gist of plaintiff's argument regarding a lack of 
any warning is substantially as follows: 
The plaintiff was unfamiliar with defendants' home 
and the location of the cellar stairs; that she entered the 
general area where the stairway was located, which fact 
was known to Mrs. Richardson, and the latter, being 
familiar with the claimed negligent way in which the 
stairway had been constructed with the door opening in-
wardly over a stairway with no top landing, was charged 
with the duty of warning the plaintiff to avoid opening 
this door. 
This argument ignores entirely the fact that the lava-
tory to which plaintiff intended going was not anywhere 
near the cellar door. (See defendants' Exhibit 1 attached 
to plaintiff's deposition.) Plaintiff walked past the area 
where the lavatory was located and into an area where 
Mrs. Richardson could not reasonably be expected to 
assume the plaintiff would go. On the other hand Mrs. 
Richardson was entirely justified in assuming that the 
plaintiff would confine her wanderings to her announced 
destination. Furthermore, it is to be borne in mind that 
plaintiff was directed specifically to a lighted room, not to 
one which was in complete darkness. If any assumptions 
I: 
I •' 
I ~ 
I ~ 
! ,. 
I ~ 
I .. 
I 
I. 
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are to be allowed in this case we submit that Mrs. Rich-
ardson had a right to assume that when she warned plain-
tiff that the light to the lavatory was on, plaintiff would 
not do as she did and open the cellar door and step into 
an unlighted area when she was totally unable to see into 
what dangers her path was leading her. An attempt is 
made to excuse the conduct of the plaintiff by contending 
that she followed the given directions and went to a 
lighted room ·which she discovered, upon entering, was 
not a lavatory but a den or a bedro01n. Hence, it is argued, 
having gone into a room which was lighted she was then 
free to enter any room or area in the premises, lighted or 
unlighted, as she saw fit and if, in consequence, she fell 
down a stairway she could not see, the host must be held 
liable for her injuries. To us, the logic of this reasoning, 
to say the least, is obscure. Was plaintiff entitled to as-
sume that because the bedroom was lighted, the lavatory 
was unlighted? Or was she justified in remaining silent 
and not advising Mrs. Richardson that she was lost or 
confused and in not asking her for further directions? 
We submit that she had been adequately advised as to 
what she would find when she got to the lavatory, namely, 
that it was lighted, and she should, as a reasonable person, 
have looked further for another lighted room or else she 
should have asked her hostess for further directions. We 
will discuss further under another section of this brief 
the conduct of the plaintiff in opening the cellar door 
and stepping forward into complete darkness. 
The complete answer to plaintiff's argument that the 
defendants' house constituted a trap and that defendants 
were under a duty to warn plaintiff to avoid such trap 
will be found in the announced decisions to which refer-
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ence is now made. Uniformly and, so far as we have been 
able to determine, unanimously, the courts, in considering 
situations such as the one disclosed by this record, have 
held that there can be no recovery for one in the position 
of the plaintiff. They also hold that a stairway such as 
the one here involved is not a trap and that failure of a 
host to warn a guest in the circumstances here presented 
is not negligence. For instance, in the case cited in ap-
pellant's brief, McHenry v. Howells, supra, the following 
factual situation is disclosed. Plaintiff, a social guest, fell 
in attempting to descend a stairway. She contended that 
the stairway was defectively constructed and constituted 
a trap of which defendants should have given warning. 
The case quotes fully the rules applicable to social guests, 
and regarding the matter of hidden defects and traps says: 
((The evidence is directed solely to an alleged 
structural defect in the stairway and to the failure 
of defendants to warn plaintiff thereof. It is mani-
fest that the alleged defect did not constitute a 
trap or hidden peril within the meaning of the 
law. The condition of the stairway was open and 
obvious; it could readily be observed by a person 
exercising ordinary care for his own safety. De-
fendants were under no obligation to reconstruct 
the stairway for the protection of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff took the premises as she found them." 
A non-suit granted on the defendants' motion was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of Oregon. In the case of 
Biggs v. Bear, supra, the Supreme Court of Illinois said 
the following: 
uunder the ISSUeS plaintiff WaS required tO 
I, 
I-
I 
, : 
i. 
I: 
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prove that defendants violated a duty to warn 
her, their guest, of a dangerous arrangement of 
doors in their kitchen; and that while exercising 
due care and as a result of defendants' failure to 
warn her, and their further negligence in failing 
to light and guard, and provide a landing be-
tween the door and the steps of the rear stair-
way, she fell down the stairs and was injured." 
In Biggs v. Bear, supra, as in the case under consideration, 
the .plaintiff, a social guest, fell down some stairs when 
she opened a door after inquiring as to the location of 
a washroom. She opened a door away from her and 
stepped and looked simultaneously into a dark area. 
There was no light and there was no landing. There were 
three or four doors which looked alike. Plaintiff, being 
unfamiliar with the premises, did not know the plan or 
location of the stairs and no warning was given her. The 
Supreme Court of Illinois on these facts held that the 
plaintiff was a social guest, that she took the premises as 
she found them. The court further stated that a social 
guest becomes a member of the family of the host and 
cannot stand upon the duty owed to a business invitee 
and further held that a social guest cannot recover against 
a host for ordinary negligence. In deciding the case the 
court further stated: 
ulf a licensee (the plaintiff), the court prop-
erly directed the verdict, since there was no evi-
dence of willful and wanton misconduct." 
In deciding this case the Supreme Court of Illinois found 
that the situation presented by the facts did not consti-
tute a trap. The situation revealed in that case is so 
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strikingly similar to the case under consideration as to be 
most startling. We submit that the case is controlling 
upon the right of the plaintiff to recover in this action. 
The case of Keretian v. Asadourian, supra, involves 
facts of a similar nature where a guest fell down a stair-
way after being informed by her host that the bathroom 
was located in a hallway and who, in looking for the 
bathroom at the end of said hallway, opened a doorway 
leading downstairs and fell and was injured. It was like-
wise stated in that case that because there was evidence 
insufficient to establish that the host's failure to give the 
guest further directions and assistance was willful and 
wanton and in the absence of evidence of a conscious in-
difference to the consequences on the part of the host 
in failing to assist the guest, there could be no recovery. 
Taneian v. Meghrigian, supra, was also a stairway case 
involving slightly different circumstances but in which a 
claim was made that the stairway used by the social guest 
had been defectively constructed. The court held that 
there could be no recovery and stated: 
uone who comes on premises by express invi-
tation to enjoy hospitality as a guest of the 
owner ,_c. ,_c. * has only the right of a licensee and 
must take the property as he finds it." 
And stated further: 
uwhere one VISitS the private home of an-
other as a social guest the owner is bound to take 
the same care of him that he takes of himself, 
and the other members of his family, and no 
more." 
I 
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Another very interesting case on the question of 
whether a stairway constitutes a trap and one which in-
volved, not as here a social guest, but a business invitee is 
Hertz v. Advertiser Company (Ala.) 78 S. 794. It 
must be borne in mind in considering this case that the 
rule as to business invitees and the duty imposed upon 
the owner of premises is much broader and much stricter 
than is the case where a purely social guest is involved. 
It the Hertz case, supra, the plaintiff opened a door 
from a vestibule which led immediately to a stairway 
which was not protected by any landing. The stairway 
was unlighted and in proceeding the plaintiff fell and was 
injured. The door opened inwardly over the stairway. 
It will be observed that the door opened in exactly the 
same manner as is alleged in plaintiff's complaint in this 
case. It was held by the Alabama court that the plaintiff 
could not recover. The court specifically held that the 
stairway, as constructed, was not a trap and further held 
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence for 
proceeding without first ascertaining that it was safe for 
her to do so. On the question of whether the stairway 
constituted a trap, the court said: 
((This rule ,z. ::- ::- does not apply to places 
strictly private, nor to places to which the public 
are not entitled or expected ::- ::- ::- to go." 
And stated further: 
((We agree ':- ::- ::- that the evidence fails to 
show that the defendant was guilty of * ::- ::-
negligence in constructing a ctrap' or (pitfall' on 
its premises, within the meaning of the * * ::- rule 
of law." 
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We will have further reference to make to this case when 
we discuss in another section of our brief the subject of 
contributory negligence. 
The Alabama court cites from Brugher v. Buchten-
kirch, (N.Y.) 60 N.E. 420, that a person must expect 
to find stairs in the hallways of buildings which case 
stated: 
tt* ::· * we know of no reason or custom which 
justifies one entering a strange house in assuming 
that the hall will continue at the same level." 
The Alabama court quoted with approval a Massachusetts 
case, the name of which is not indicated as follows: 
HW e cannot think such a construction is of 
itself defective or negligent." 
An interesting case on the subject of what constitutes 
a trap is Alabama Great Southern v. Campbell, (Ala.) 26 
So. 2d 124. This case involved a railroad crossing into 
private land which was reached over a narrow road which 
crossed the defendant's tracks. The plaintiff's son driving 
the plaintiff's automobile over the crossing caught the 
wheels on the rails which prevented the driver from getting 
the car off the track. It was struck by a passing train 
and was damaged. It was claimed that the crossing was 
a trap. It was held there could be no recovery. After 
holding that the driver was a trespasser or a bare licensee, 
the court said: 
uA trap has been defined as ca danger which a 
person who does not know the premises could 
not avoid by reasonable care or skill.' cTraps 
i: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
must be intentionally set for the licensee.' 
~certainly the crossing involved in this case 
could in nowise be regarded as a trap.'" 
Furthermore, the plaintiff in opening the door to the 
cellar and stepping inside entered into a portion of de-
fendants' premises to which she had asked no permission 
to enter and to which no invitation had been extended. 
The law is clear that when a social guest enters a por-
tion of the host's premises to which no invitation has been 
extended, the guest cannot recover for injuries received 
on the portion of the premises thus entered. In such a 
situation there is not even a duty to warn even though a 
trap may exist in fact. Laube v. Stevenson, supra, Lube-
now v. Cook, supra, Hertz v. Advertiser Company, supra. 
It is plain from the record that the plaintiff was not 
asked or invited to visit the defendants' cellar. In open-
ing the cellar door and entering she exceeded the lil'!lits 
of her right to use the defendants' premises and any un-
toward event occurring to her was a risk which she as-
sumed herself. It is no answer for plaintiff to contend 
that she was unaware of the dangers into which her journey 
was leading her or that she should have been warned. As 
we have already pointed out, neither of the defendants 
knew what plaintiff was about to do. 
Failure to warn even under such circumstances would 
not excuse the want of ordinary care on the part of the 
plaintiff. James K. Richardson was completely unaware 
of what was taking place and all that Mrs. Richardson 
knew was that plaintiff said she was going to the lavatory. 
A duty to warn only exists when the host knows that 
the guest is exposed to dangers which he knows are con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
cealed from the guest or which the guest is unlikely t-o 
discover for himself and against which he should not he 
expected to protect himself. 
Reference has already been made to the cases holding 
that stairways are not traps even when constructed as 
the one here involved was constructed. These cases like-
wise hold that stairways are not traps even though un-
lighted and even though they are constructed without 
landings. Social and even business guests are supposed to 
know that there is at least a possibility that when one 
opens a door on unfamiliar premises he may immediately 
encounter a stairway and that if he opens such a door 
and encounters darkness he should either be extremely 
cautious or not venture forward at all or until he can 
see where he is going. 
Plaintiff in her brief relies upon the case of Deacy v. 
McDonnell, (Conn.) 38 Atl. 2d 181. That case involved 
a social guest of the servant of the defendants, who, in 
leaving the premises at night, fell because she did not see 
a step down to the porch and the servant failed to turn 
on the light so that she could see. Aside from the fact 
that the case announces a very questionable rule of law, 
it is very different from the facts here presented. The 
case is bad law because it held defendants liable to a 
social guest, not invited upon the premises by them, but 
by their servant in connection with the servant's social 
pursuits. It made the servant's act in failing to turn on 
the light the act of the defendants. The case is decided 
upon the theory that failure to turn on the light was 
negligence. It simply held that in the absence of so 
doing a warning should have been given to the plaintiff. 
I 
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In the Deacy case the plaintiff was leaving the premises 
by a route she had to traverse or at least one which she 
might be expected to use. In this case the plaintiff was 
not expected nor did she have any reason to use the 
cellar steps in going to the lavatory. Furthermore, the 
Deacy case stands alone as one which imposed liability 
upon a host for injuries to a social guest in a situation 
not comparable to this case and is not in accord with 
the overwhelming weight of authority. 
(b) THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
It should require no citation of authorities to sustain 
the proposition that a licensee, social or otherwise, is 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care for his own 
safety. This court has more than once announced such 
a rule in cases involving business invitees toward whom 
a much higher duty of care exists than toward a social 
guest. 
Knox v. Snow, (Utah) 229 P. 2d 874 
Scoffield v. Sprouse Reitz, (Utah) 265 P. 2d 396. 
In Knox v. Snow, supra, this court said: 
((Plaintiff seeks to justify his failure to observe 
the danger which was clearly visible because his 
sole interest was in the tire on the rack; that he 
didn't see the ladder or the pit because he wasn't 
looking at the floor or wasn't watching where he 
was stepping :-.- * ::- It thus becomes apparent that 
this is not a case where plaintiff used reasonable 
care for his own safety. A reasonable person 
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makes some observations along the path he chooses 
to follow." 
This court held the plaintiff in that case was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law for his failure 
to take reasonable care for his own safety. 
In other jurisdictions involving both business invitees 
and social guests, the same rule has been announced in 
many cases. 
Lubenow v. Cook, supra 
McHenry v. Howells, supra 
Hertz v. Advertiser Company, supra 
Brugher v. Buchtenkirch, supra 
McNaughton v. The Railway Company, (Iowa) 
113 N.W. 845 
That such rules of conduct are reasonable can scarcely 
be denied. It is submitted that the plaintiff in this case 
did not conform to the rule which required her to take 
that care of herself which she should be reasonably ex-
pected to exercise and which, if so exercised, would have 
prevented any injury at all from occurring. 
On page 10 of her brief plaintiff asks the question 
if one may he held negligent who opens a door and steps 
forward even though the space on the other side of it 
is dark and if one may not assume that where a door 
opens inwardly there will be a floor or platform beyond 
or if one is obliged to assume that open space will be en-
countered or a stairway. The answer to the first ques-
tion is that when anyone steps blindly into a situation 
where he cannot see, he is negligent. In Hertz v. The 
Advertiser Company, supra, the court said as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~~~Wl 
19 
ttW e are of the opinion that the undisputed 
evidence showed plaintiff to have been guilty of 
negligence ~- ~- * if they (the premises) were not 
properly lighted, she should have been more care-
ful in going out of the vestibule into the main 
office building. She had no right to assume that 
the floor of the office building was on the same 
level as the floor of the vestibule. There was a 
door between the two apartments, and this of 
itself was a warning to those entering, who were 
not acquainted, to ascertain whether the floor to 
the main building was on a level with the vesti-
bule and sidewalk or whether it was reached by 
ascending or descending stairs. She is shown not 
to have exercised the slightest degree of care to 
ascertain what was beyond the door which sepa-
rated the vestibule from the floor of the main 
office. Her own evidence shows that this door 
was shut, that she herself opened it, and stepped 
or walked right through as if the floor were on 
a level, and fell down the stairs in consequence 
of her own negligence, in failing to ascertain 
whether or not there were steps or stairs * ~- ~- . " 
We have already cited the quotation from Brugher v. 
Buchtenkirch, supra, to the same effect that one may not 
assume on entering a strange house that a hall will con-
tinue on the same level. To the same effect is a quotation 
from Hoyt v. Woodbury, (Mass.) 86 N.E. 772 in which 
the court said: 
((Persons entering such buildings are charged 
with knowledge that they are not entering from 
a perfectly level sidewalk ~- ~- * etc." 
And in McNa.ughton v. The Railway Company, supra, 
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the court had this to say as quoted 1n the Hertz case, 
supra: 
((The fact that a door is there is a warning 
that it is the means of exit or of entrance from 
or to some other apartment and a way up or 
down stairs, or to a baggage-room, or to a closet; 
and no one has the right to assume, without knowl-
edge, or its equivalent, the character of the place 
to which it affords access." 
In Scoffield v. Sprouse Reitz, supra, this court held I: 
that a business invitee could not assume that there was 
a railing surrounding a platform when the plaintiff fell 
from the platform as he turned to leave the premiSes 
without looking to see if there was a railing. 
The plaintiff in this case did exactly the same thing 
as was done by the plaintiff in Biggs v. Bear, supra. There 
the plaintiff, not knowing which of three doors gave 
access to a washroom, opened the stairway door, stepped 
forward into darkness and fell down the stairway. We 
submit that the conduct of the plaintiff in this case was 
identical to that of the plaintiff in Biggs v. Bear, supra, 
and that, as a consequence, the plaintiff in this case has 
no better or superior right to expect recovery than the 
plaintiff in the case cited. 
An analogous situation involving drivers of automo-
biles has been decided in several cases by this court, in 
which it has been held negligence for a driver to operate 
a car forward on a highway when he cannot see what 
is ahead of him. See Nikoleropoulos v. Rantsey, 61 Utah 
465,214 P. 304; Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products 
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Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309 and Hansen v. Clyde, 89 
Utah 31, 56 P. 2d 1366~ 
If the foregoing cases constitute good law and if it 
is neglige~ce for a driver to operate an automobile so 
that he cannot stop it within the distance he can see 
ahead of him, how may one step forward into blackness 
and escape the charge that he was negligent in so doing? 
As the cases above cited hold, one who is upon 
premises with which he is unfamiliar may not assume 
any condition of safety beyond his range of vision, espe-
cially if concealed by darkness. One must assume that 
a stairway may lie behind a closed door and act ac-
cordingly. One may not assume that a platform will 
exist beyond such a door merely because it might be a 
good idea to have one. These rules apply with special 
force and emphasis to a social guest. Certain it is that 
the plaintiff had no right to assume that the door which 
she opened and stepped inside of, led to the lavatory. 
Furthermore, one should not be heard to complain if 
he proceeds into an area where he cannot see what lies 
before him, especially if he has been told specifically to 
look for an area which has been lighted for his protection. 
It is respectfully submitted that the record here 
plainly shows that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law and to require the trial 
court to hear further evidence as to whether the lavatory 
light was actually on or off could serve no useful pur-
pose. Counsel cites the correct rule of law applicable to 
this case from 38 Am. fur., Sec. 184, page 861, as follows: 
((He will be deemed to have been guilty (of 
negligence) if it is shown that he knew or reas-
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onably should have known of the peril and might 
have avoided it by the exercise of ordinary care." 
CONCLUSION 
Because the record in this case already conclusively 
shows that plaintiff was a social guest or a gratuitous 
licensee on the premises of defendants at the time of her 
injury, and it further appears that defendants were 
guilty of no active affirmative negligence toward her, 
and no situation existed which constituted a trap of 
which defendants had a duty to warn the plaintiff, and 
she herself by her own want of ordinary care brought 
about her injuries, the summary judgment entered by 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER and 
ALBERT R. BOWEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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